I hope that everyone has a joyous and safe Christmas.  May you get all you need, and some things you want.  Peace and Good Tidings to All from The Heartland!

[Below is exactly what I wrote last Thursday night when the Mitchell Report was released, and I had intended to write a ******* of a post.  Life, especially grading, intervened.  I pulled an all-nighter to get papers graded to return to students after they submitted their finals, then had lunch with others, then came home for my wife's Cookie Weekend with her sister, when they make a dozen different cookie styles, and I am the official sampler for fudge, and peanut butter cookies.  Weighty responsibilities.  Saturday night, news broke of Pettite's admission to taking HGH in 2002 as he recovered from an elbow injury--most disappointing, but he did the right thing and owned up to it.  I thought he might based upon his reaction to the Mitchell Report, which referred to his lawyer--never a good sign.  More to come in the following days.]

My apologies to those of you--mainly Mike--who might have been waiting for a post on this last night.  I was exhausted from grading and various family duties, and went to bed late, yet still earlier than I had planned. I cannot promise something too long, though it might end up being that.  But I will try to do is offer some different commentary from what has circulated around media and blogs thus far, which has been on the whole good.

For starters (pardon the pun), this report was not good news, especially for Clemens and Pettite.  Sure, the report is problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the paucity of eyewitness accounts.  This report relies nearly exclusively on the accounts of Kirk Radomski and Yankees' and Blue Jays' trainer Brian McNamee, and a host of secondary sources and newspaper stories.  This report is also certainly a product of the dearth of people who agreed to speak with Mitchell's investigators, since he lacked subpoena power, making the accounts of Radomski and McNamee weigh more heavily, and the Yankees, Mets, and Blue Jays look (perhaps unfairly) worse than others.  Without these, the report would be desperately thin and far weaker. More on these later.  Yet it is difficult for critics of the report, and defenders of Clemens and Pettite in particular, to say that McNamee's account isn't compelling.  It is, and as trainer, he recalled intricate details of obtaining drugs from Radomski, and personally injecting Clemens and Pettite. [Mitchell Report, pp. 167-176]  Combined with his role as trainer, these details may or may not be true, but they're compelling and therefore plausible.  Sure, McNamee was facing jail time and therefore willing to spill the beans to obtain a reduced sentence; therefore, he had motive to testify as he did.  Yet his own engagement in the criminal trafficking of steroids does not necessarily render him a liar, just suspect himself.  Note also that Pettite's alleged use of HGH in 2002 as he recovered from an elbow injury preceded his throwing precipitously harder, steadily in the mid-90s in 2003.  Whether or not this was connected to possible HGH use, who knows, but it's possible that HGH, used to reduced the recovery time from injuries, allowed him to more rapidly resume normal throwing and workout routines and gain strength.  That's at least possible. 

I must also say that people, including myself, who long and rightly suspected Barry Bonds of steroid use should take this report, for all its faults, somewhat seriously because Bonds will likely be tried for perjury and obstruction of justice charges on similar types of evidence--eyewitness accounts, possibly personal checks (of which there are many copied into the Mitchell Report, though not from Clemens or Pettite), receipts and mailing invoices (of which there are some in the Mitchell Report), and of course his failed steroids test.  Granted, there are few examples of failed steroids tests in the report for various reasons--the slow, changing development of steroids testing for MLB, labor relations issues (that I'll address below), the time when players cited in the report were using steroids (from 2-9 years from the present day), the graduation of players from myriad steroids to oil-based HGH to water-based HGH to clean out quickly and ease detection.  Yet we as outsiders cannot hold Bonds to one, long-standing set of criteria on the one hand, then flatly demand drug tests when this was and is highly problematic for various reasons.  We have to at least consider that the dense details tracing clubhouse social networks among players, between players and attendants, and between players and trainers, to be at least plausible and in a good many cases true.

I would also challenge those who believe that the Yankees got the brunt of this report, while the Red Sox got off free to actually read the report, as I and others have.  True, Mitchell sits on the Red Sox Board of Directors, a conflict of interest. But to reiterate, the Report is a product of who spoke and, more so, who didn't, rendering the findings skewed by default.  Had Mitchell's held subpoena power, make no mistake that this would have been not only more detailed, but far more incriminating for all MLB teams, without question. Also, some Red Sox players admitted or were in fact suspected of using steroids, just not the big names.  Jeremy Giambi, for example, admitted that he used steroids while with the Red Sox and well earlier. [Mitchell Report, 133-134]  So did Mike Spinelli, a minor-league Red Sox player. [Mitchell Report, 76] Steroids and needles were found in the car of Manny Alexander in 2000, yet there was uncertainty about whether these were Alexander's of clubhouse worker Carlos Cowart, to whom Alexander apparently lent the car. Mo Vaughn was alleged to have used steroids in 2001 after he left the Red Sox, but could have also used them before, who knows. More troubling, to me, is that the Red Sox traded for a player in Eric Gagne (GagMe) in 2007 whom Theo Epstein and others strongly suspected of using steroids by November 2006, when they considered trading for him. [Mitchell Report, 219]  This is shameful, but worse, right in line with what I believe--that management, from the dugout managers to upper-level executives, have been at best ignorant and at worst complicit in covering up, aiding and/or abetting the abuse of steroids and HGH by continuing to care more for their own success and profit than the health and well-being of players. I'll post more about this later, but the Epstein example, in which he had an e-mail exchange with a scout over Gagne, is really the tip of the iceberg in the Mitchell Report.  It is literally littered with numerous examples of managers and executives relaying their concerns, either at the time or post facto, but failing to push for swift justice.  Worse, as I'll write soon enough, this whole report is an anti-union, anti-MLBPA screed, framing the MLBPA as simply obstructionist on drug enforcement, yet terming owners and managers "less than responsive." What a hoot.  I'm not defending the MLBPA much on steroids; the union did a poor job owning up to matters and getting help for drug abusers within their ranks, and that's shameful. Yet so did owners and managers, all too often, but the Report isn't framed as such.

The main point should not be whether or not the Yankees were treated unfairly. That judgment should come if Bud Zelig makes the foolish decision to discipline players post facto, against Mitchell's recommendations. This Report, for all its faults, incriminates all parties involved--players, owners and management, and the MLBPA--the latter too much so in my opinion, to which I'll turn next.  Its incomplete nature is also problematic at best, inherently compromised at worst, and it deserves a good skewering for that also.

[I then ran out of steam, had much work left to do in the coming days and other matters arose, such as the need to shovel eight inches of snow from Saturday night, and my son's first sleepover, which was a blast.  Then the news of Pettite broke.  I'm still dismayed about this, and I'd be lying if I said I wasn't disappointed in him.  At the same time, he fessed up to this and quickly, and for that he deserves some kudos.  I suspect it has to do with his faith, and that he's by and large been a stand-up guy.  He may have shown flawed character in private with his taking HGH in 2002, but he showed strong, forthright character in public when his name appeared in the Mitchell Report.  He took the lead in owning up to his transgressions.  Others in a similarly, and if rightly, incriminated position, should do the same.

I wish I had been wrong in my comments above, and take no solace in their accuracy, unknown to me at the time.  in the immortal words of Charlie Brown, "Ugh."]

I will blog at great length later tonight about the Mitchell Report, though it's already spread like wildfire through media and the blogosphere, understandably.  I'll say this much, it's not good news for lots of people, not the least of whom are those named.  Yet having read much of the report, and I'll finish it tonight, management looks as bad as anyone in it despite having been largely let off the hook.  Some of it is compelling, whether or not we know it to be true.  For the most part, there is a consistent pattern from Bud Zelig and MLB that I'll explore later.  Be forewarned--if you do not want to read a lengthy post, do not read mine on the Mitchell Report later.  It won't be War and Peace, but it will be long, deservedly so.

On to the good news.  A-Rod finally re-signed with the Yankees today, inking a 10-year, $275-million deal that, with bonuses, can net him over $300 million.  This is very good news for all parties involved. The Yankees and A-Rod needed each other for many reasons.  A-Rod would likely not have gotten that kind of payday from any other team, and has much unfinished business for the Yankees. The Yanks clearly needed a very good third baseman and the best right-handed bat in the game, which A-Rod is.  He'll make the rest of the lineup go, and it's an outstanding lineup.  The Yankees will be a very good team in 2008, no question, and A-Rod will have a lot to do with that.

I'm pleased he's back, and willing now to bury the hatchet with his opting out which he rightly referred to as "a debacle." Indeed, one in which he and the somewhat disgraced Scott Boras badly misread the Yankees and the free-agent market while stepping on their own public-relations land mines.  A-Rod did the right thing today, accepting blame as any adult should for his actions, while also passing enough blame onto Boras to help smooth things over with the Yankees and the fans.  He can plausibly say that he was badly advised, though Boras did his bidding, too. Yet re-signing solves that October Surprise for the next few months.  He'll need to perform very well out of the gate in 2008 to ensure that the remnants of discontent among Yankees fans do not become a cacophony of malice towards him, but he's certainly capable of that.  There's not much reason to think that he won't continue to play great ball for the Yankees. He just needs to shape up his October play.

A-Rod, welcome back.  Just continue to mature, make the right decisions, and stay focused.  You'll do just fine.  I stuck with you throughout your deep slump in 2006, and was as proud as anyone of you for your brilliant play in 2007.  Much of my animosity toward you was because you jilted the Yanks, and you shouldn't have.  It was foolish and selfish, but re-signing helps to make amends. Winning a World Series, playing well in October--those would erase all that for good.  But just playing as hard as you can, as you already do, will earn you more than your share of breaks with me. It always did before, and it will still in the future.  You're a great ballplayer, you play hard, you're back where you belong as a Yankee, and that matters most with me.

Now go tear it up, kid.

It's been a while since something has been stuck in my craw, and I'm going to exorcise this forthwith.  The Veterans' Committee vote that elected five people, including Bowie Kuhn, while leaving out Marvin Miller yet again is an abject disgrace to Miller, the game, and to the MLBPA.  As I'll discuss below, it's also indicative of a persistent anti-unionism within baseball that has deleterious ramifications extending far beyond Miller's exclusion, but to historical memory in a superficial recasting of recent baseball and sports history.

Miller has a fascinating personal history. Still kicking at the age of 90, he was a labor economist who worked with the National War Labor Board (NWLB) during World War Two and later with the International Association of Machinists (IAM) and the United Steelworkers of America (USWA). He became head of the MLBPA in 1966 and immediately put his smarts and public-relations genius to work for the Players' Association, negotiating continuously improved contracts that did far more than increase the average and overall salaries of baseball players.  In fact, he introduced the NLRB system of industrial jurisprudence to baseball, which had been ruled by the Byzantine fiefdom of the owner-appointed commissioner (a throwback to the Black Sox Scandal), the reserve clause, and the commissioner's dictates on league policy.  After Miller, baseball owners were brought kicking and screaming into twentieth-century labor relations and placed on relatively equal footing with players in matters such as, negotiations, grievances--another new post-Miller concept, but with actual teeth with Miller at the MLBPA helm--and safety. 

On this last note, it is easy, and not entirely inaccurate, to assess Miller's impact upon the game as primarily financial for the players.  I would contend that this is not a bad thing, since owners have for over a century proven themselves incapable of keeping the public trust, the integrity of the game, and the concerns of the players at the forefront of their consciousness. They're business people first and foremost, and therefore most interested in making a buck, even and particularly if it came at the expense of players and what potential control they might exhibit over their playing and negotiating conditions. Miller changed far more than the economic equation in the players' favor.  Rooted in his labor background, he also fought for better safety standards that have thankfully become staples of the sport, from padded walls to wider warning tracks.  Think what more Matt Keough could have done had he not been clocked in the dugout by a foul ball, nearly costing him his life.  That safety improvement--the padded-rail and fence protecting players and managers in the dugout--came well after Miller's tenure with the MLBPA, yet it was also part of the trajectory of improved safety consciousness among players and, yes at long last, owners to protect people, or at least their investments in people.  Miller was fundamental to this and more.

He, as well as baseball players and owners, took a public-relations beating from fans, far too many of whom cut from the bread-and-circuses cloth, for the multiple strikes in baseball during the 1970s and 1980s.  The predominant focus on the escalating salaries of players--during a time of heightened economic insecurity for many blue-collar fans increasingly out of jobs--did not go over well with the public. Nor is Miller without his own copious ego.  Yet justifiable though some hard feelings might have been toward the loss of a great spectator sport such as baseball, these overlooked the starkly different conditions confronting--indeed inflicted upon--players in the period immediately preceding the period of tumultuous labor-owner strife in baseball.  Prior to the rise of free agency--which Curt Flood (another person deserving Hall of Fame status) did more than anyone, at great professional and financial risk, to advance--players toiled under the "reserve clause." This feudal form of quasi-ownership limited players' "rights" to:  negotiating as an individual with owners, who unsurprisingly held most of the bargaining power; de facto negotiations on an annual, insecure basis; asking to be released should they not receive a contract to their liking; and possibly not playing well intentionally in order to facilitate a release.  They had no rights to speak with other teams about contracts even if they were no longer under one. Terming the reserve clause a system of rights is more than a stretch, but a fabrication. For all intents and purposes, owners owned players, period. 

That changed drastically with Miller, players' self-organization and the rise of rights and identity consciousness in baseball, sports, and American life in the 1950s and especially the turbulent 1960s.When the public at large becomes dissatisfied with strikes and lockouts and grows weary of the strife and struggle, as it has during the current Writers Guild of America (WGA) strike, people often consider their immediate needs and wants first, which is understandable.  Yet surpassing the inconvenience and understanding the underlying issues at stake is crucial to see not just that two sides are fighting, but why they are fighting.  Miller's exclusion from the Hall of Fame by the so-called Veterans Committee is more than a disgrace to Miller and the game.  It's an attempt to recast the history of baseball in different, more owner-friendly, and I would argue anti-union ways that fail to assess the impact of Miller and unionism in American life and culture. 

The examples of this are impossible to miss. For starters, Bowie Kuhn's election to the Hall over Miller was a direct slap to the players who played under Kuhn.  I won't recount too many details from two great articles about Kuhn linked below, but for anyone interested in reading more about Kuhn's legacy, his selfishness, inflated ego, problematic decisions regarding race, and downright bigoted, reversion to Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) [legally establishing separate-but-equal provisions for segregating public institutions and spaces] proposal for a separate and unequal wing for Satchel Paige in the Hall of Fame since he wasn't in the Major Leagues--all the while ignoring how systemic racism kept him and other players of color out of a segregated game--please read Fay Vincent's powerful December 8 Op-ED in the New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/08/opinion/08vincent.html?_r=1&oref=slogin) and Mike Carminati's wonderful post at "Mike's Baseball Rants" on the sterling website Baseball Toaster (http://mikesrants.baseballtoaster.com/archives/877398.html). Kuhn couldn't hold Miller's briefcase when it came to labor relations, public relations and human decency.

Much of the problem regarding the actual Veterans Committee vote is institutional.  The Veterans Committee is comprised of twelve voting members each year, and it isn't difficult to see why Miller received only three of twelve possible Committee votes. Of the twelve voting members, two are Hall-of-Fame players (this year these were Monte Irvin and Billy Williams, according to MLB.com), seven are current and former executives, and three are media members that comprise the "executives and pioneers" committee.  Thus, while there are nine Hall-of-Fame players and managers out of sixteen (with three executives and four veteran media members) who get to vote on the "managers and umpires" committee, there are far fewer players and far more executives who get to vote on a committee that determines the historical legacy of a union leader.  (http://pressbox.mlb.com/pressbox/news/pressbox_story.jsp?ymd=20071203&content_id=2315928&vkey=pressbox&fext=.jsp) Kuhn's legacy, on the other hand, is determined by a panel comprised mostly of his peers.  According to Allen Berra of The Village Voice, this was the 2007 Veterans Committee: "Monte Irvin and Harmon Killebrew [Edit: Note the discrepancy from above]; former Yankee player and American League president Bobby Brown; John Harringon, formerly of the Red Sox; current executives Jerry Bell (Twins), Bill DeWitt (Cardinals), Bill Giles (Phillies), David Glass (Royals), and Andy MacPhail (Orioles); UNLOCK TABLES; --and media members Paul Hagen (Philadelphia Daily News), Rick Hummel --(St. Louis Post-Dispatch), and Hal McCoy (Dayton Daily News)."

A significant problem is that the votes are secret, so the public does not learn who voted for whom. Yet in Miller's case, it's in all likelihood clear.  While we do not know, it is very likely that one executive or media member voted for Miller with Irvin and Williams.  This would come as little surprise from executives, but which media members voted, and how they voted, is worth examining afterwards. However, without their revealing how they voted, this won't happen. I'll quote Jim Bouton at length from a recent piece in The Village Voice, concerning the possibility of players' own possible failure to challenge, or even tacit complicity in, the current system of Hall voting:

"How did these people vote, and why are their votes kept secret? And --why aren't there more players on that committee? Hank Aaron, Jim --Bunning, Bob Gibson, Fergie Jenkins—they're all on the committee for --reviewing the managers and umpires. Essentially, the decision for --putting a union leader in the Hall of Fame was handed over to a bunch --of executives and former executives. Marvin Miller kicked their butts --and took power away from the baseball establishment—do you really think --those people are going to vote him in? It's a joke... I blame the --players. It's their Hall of Fame; it's their balls and bats that make --the hall what it is. Where are the public outcries from Joe Morgan or Reggie Jackson, --who was a player rep? Why don't these guys see that some of their own --get on these committees? That's the least they owe Marvin Miller. Do --they think they became millionaires because of the owners' generosity?"

I think that Bouton goes a bit too far concerning his blaming the players. Far too many people determine the fate of people getting or not getting into the Hall of Fame, as we have seen, and they have snugly ensconced themselves, not the least of whom are media. But he does have a strong point.  To what degree have players fought for increased say over the fate of people like Miller and Kuhn? Also, it's possible that players themselves have done little for Miller and other players' access to the Hall of Fame, potentially concerned that letting in others through committees would "dilute" the ranks with players who did not get in originally. Thus, it becomes a club of sorts, a hallowed but parochial place in which current members may be indifferent to the history of their own material improvement through Miller and other players, or at least as likely, unwilling to allow equal status to others once they get the chance to determine people's legacies.  If this is so, it would be the biggest travesty of all--that the culture of baseball unionism for all its successes for the players, may still have failed to breach the institutions that are supposed to be devoted to the players themselves and the game. Worse, they may have ignored or never learned the lessons that Miller fought for and sought to instill--that unionism at its best is about rights, and is predicated on fundamental issues of equality not just between labor and management, but among labor itself. For all the MLBPA has achieved, it seems to have much farther yet to come and more to face and overcome, from within and without.

In this day and age, when the power of American labor unions continues in historic, state-abetted free fall too often met with shrugs from blue-collar people, the insuperable impact of Marvin Miller is worth rescuing.

Citing a FoxSports report, ESPN is reporting that the Yankees are close to signing free-agent journeyman reliever LaTroy Hawkins, who was 2-5 with a 3.42 ERA last year with Colorado.  This wouldn't be a bad move. Hawkins has kept his walks, and therefore his WHIP, down in recent years, and still throws quite hard. Though it's very unlikely that the Yankees will manufacture some major deal to shore up the bullpen, cobbling together decent veterans like Hawkins to couple with some young arms is a wise and inexpensive move.  The reported deal for Hawkins would be a one-year deal, and I doubt that the Yanks will obtain a good enough reliever who would justify a multi-year deal.  Sorry, Viz, you don't merit one.

[Edit: The Yankees' website made it official today, stating that the Yankees and Hawkins have agreed to the basics of a deal. This certainly isn't ground-breaking stuff, but I'm sure most of us can agree that the fewer the spots available for Matt DeSalvo and Kei Igawa, the better. Not a bad signing, not expensive, and not long-term.]

That's the first thing I thought of when I read Pete Abe's post this afternoon, confirming that the Yankees were involved in initial discussion to gauge the trade value of Hideki Matsui, and the names mentioned were Noah Lowry and Rich Aurilia.  Ahem. For anyone out there who thought that the inclusion of Phil Hughes in a potential package for Johan Santana was a questionable move, this one should have 100-decibel sirens going off, because it sure does for me. To quote the immortal Wayne, 'Ex-squeeze me? Baking powder?" Trading Tyler Clippard and Kyle Farnsworth seems about the equivalent of these chuckleheads. To pair Matsui, even as a test balloon (which I think he is) is a disgrace to him, the organization, and test balloons.

Noah Lowry isn't exactly a dud, but nor is he a stud. In 156 IP, he allowed 155 hits, and 12 homers, and an ERA of 3.92--not too bad.  Yet here comes the bad news. He walked 87, and struck out exactly the same amount.  That is, he both walked and struck out about 5 per nine innings, which is lousy on the first front (walks), and mediocre on the second (strikeouts). More disturbingly, his walks per nine IP was up in 2007 from 2006, when he walked 56 in 159 1/3IP, though his ERA dropped.  He also allowed fewer homers and he is young (he'll be 28 next October), but that's cold comfort because he's young and experienced, but will likely never be better than Hughes, Joba, and Kennedy.  Aurilia doesn't impress at his age (35), when his best home-run hitting days are in all likelihood behind him, when he batted all of .252 in 99 games with the Giants (55 at first, and the rest scattered about the infield), with five homers, 33 RBIs, and an OBP of .304 to his 2007 resume. This is trade bait? Like a tin of night-crawlers in exchange for crab legs.

To repeat, the Yankees considered trading an average defensive outfielder but very productive bat in Matsui, who hit 25 homers, drove in 103, had an average of .285, and OBP of .367, while missing 19 games because of a gimpy knee on which he had arthroscopic surgery this off-season--and has been historically very productive offensively in five years with the Yankees, driving in more than 100 runs every year except the injury-shortened 2006--and the Giants counter with mediocre Noah Lowry and over-the-hill Rich Aurilia? That should have elicited a prompt nugatory.

Brian Cashman, please tell me that this was just a trial balloon, that this was just an attempt to move a productive player for the chance to get Cain or LIncecum (preferably Lincecum) and, short of that, there is no deal. Please tell me that, with the Santana deal dead (which is fine with me), there isn't a paranoid need to grab any plain-Jane starter with some dirt under the nails just to complement a young but talented group waiting in the wings. Mind you, I'm not against the Yankees' obtaining an experienced starter. I'm just opposed to trading talent for mediocrity, especially when the potential for obtaining mediocrity in return had a strikeout ratio slightly below that of the infirmed Matt Morris, whom the Yankees pounded but let off the hook in one of their worst losses on Saturday, June 23, 2007.  Don't trade for an "if."

I trust Cashman, and trust further than no deal took place because of the meager offerings in return for a very good offensive player in Matsui, who will likely drive in another 100 in pinstripes if given the chance. I also have the hunch that the slow Winter Meetings inflated this into a bigger production than it normally would have been, and reporters were glomming into any tidbit in order to sate their parent outlets. But clearly the Yankees were listening, and it shows a couple things. One, the Yankees may be wary of having so many young starters, somewhat justified, somewhat not after what they trotted onto the field last April and May. Two, the Yankees feel they have enough offense--maybe correct but overlooking Matsui's excellent productivity, which should stay in my opinion--and are willing to ship his salary to save money for the upcoming post-2008 bonanza, when Mussina and Giambi come off the payroll. Three, it possibly reflects a willingness to go with Giambi, who's as brittle as a dead branch on a cold January day, instead of Matsui, who's had his share of injuries but, unlike Giambi, is consistently productive and actually does a decent job in the field--that is, it primarily reflects lapsed judgment.

What would Lowry and Aurilia likely add? Head-scratching, mediocrity, a right-handed Mientkiewicz at best, a lighter-hitting Josh Phelps at worst, plus a slightly more experienced version of Igawa (you know, the guy who walked a ton of guys and got tattooed) simply to add a lefty.  No thanks.  I strongly expect that Cashman floated a trial balloon and didn't like the response, and this became news primarily because of the unrequited news the Winter Meetings generated. Cashman is too smart to parley Matsui, still a high quality offensive player, for patchwork mediocrity.  At least, I trust that, since making that trade would be roughly worth a bag of hockey pucks at Legends Field in mid-February.  Keep Matsui, let him do most of the DHing and rotate him into the outfield now and then, let Giambi play first if anything to allow Matsui's bat in the lineup, and wait for actual offers to arise. Short of that, stay calm and don't chase the windmills of mediocrity.

The Yankees traded Tyler Clippard to the Washington Nationals for Jonathan Albaladejo, a big right-handed reliever.  I only know Albaladejo's statistics, and in fourteen games with the Nats, they're pretty good.  In 14 1/3 IP, he had a 1.88 ERA with 12 Ks--not too shabby.  Clippard wouldn't have seen action with the Yankees unless there was an injury.  The kid has grit, but not electric stuff.  He also needs to learn--and he's still young--not to hang his breaking pitches, which often looked like Jeff Weaver's frisbee puff ball last year. 

In bigger news, The Tigers traded youngsters in outfielder Cameron Maybin and pitcher Andrew Miller, along with catcher Mike Rabelo and picks, to the Marlins for Miguel Cabrera and Dontrelle Willis.  It's a big-time move that significantly improves the Tigers' lineup, providing a very good bat with power from the right side to supplement Dead-to-Me Sheffield's oft-injured shoulder, and Magglio Ordonez.  Yet I don't find myself too exercised or panicked by this trade.  For certain, it makes the Tigers more formidable offensively, not to be overlooked.  When healthy, their lineup will be daunting, especially with even more protection for Ordonez.  But Willis, while still young and a good pitcher, isn't exactly the second coming of Sandy Koufax.  He had a terrible 2007--10-15 with a 5.17 ERA, while surrendering 29 homers. Though it's possible that 2007 was an aberration, and that he'll improve with a better team, it's also possible that he'll struggle in his transition to the better, more offensive oriented AL.  The Tigers made a bold move and should be able to hit with most teams.  Yet their pitching, to me, is suspect.  Aside from reliable starters Verlander and Bonderman (who was shut down for the remaining month, BTW), Nate Robertson was 9-13 with a 4.76 ERA, and Pine Tar Rogers was 3-4 with a 4.43 ERA.  That is, they have a pretty decent staff, far from spectacular, and Joel Zumaya was injured this off-season.  Their staff has some significant issues yet to address.

Meanwhile, all is quiet on the Western front, with the Yankees apparently not pursuing the Santana deal for now.  The Twins selfishly tried to wrest Ian Kennedy from the Yankees as the third player, and New York rightly said no.  For now, if not for good, the Yankees are done trying to trade for Santana.  That's fine with me, too.  While I'd love to see Santana in pinstripes, there's no way the Yankees should trade away the farm for him, either.  They have a few young, relatively inexperienced starters who may be in the rotation--Hughes, Joba, and Kennedy--but they availed themselves well last year, and will likely improve with experience.  Should the 2008 rotation be Pettite, Wang, Joba, Hughes, and Kennedy, would there be any of us who wouldn't consider it a significant improvement over Pettite, Wang, Mussina, Igawa, and Karstens? I sure do.  It's not perfect, and rests on the hope that the kids will both perform and improve with experience.  Still, it's better than what the Yankees fielded last year without question.

Now it's time to address the bullpen.  Lastly, best of luck to Andy Phillips, who was DFA'd by the Yankees. He played hard, experienced some hard luck personally and professionally, but was a hard-nosed kid who gave what he had, and had some nice, clutch moments in 2007 before his season-ending injury.  All the Best, Andy.

From 6:30 a.m. until nearly 11 p.m., I hadn't stopped long enough to catch my breath, much less to get on the computer to post.  I wrote in the morning, gave a guest lecture in a good friend's class at 1 p.m., presented a rough draft of my dissertation chapter to a group this afternoon, hopped in the car, grabbed the kids and fed them, picked up my wife from work, then headed to a second group to discuss my same dissertation draft.  So when I saw the news this morning that Andy Pettite was coming back, I knew that discussing it in any detail worth a post would unfortunately have to wait.

Needless to say, I'm thrilled that Pettite is returning.  He was a rock in the rotation last season and certainly in his earlier stint with the Yanks, frequently gave the Yankees a very good chance to win, and was nothing short of outstanding in his lone start in the 2007 ALDS.  He also became a more vocal leader in a clubhouse that seemed adrift the first three months of the season, and set a good example of hard work and preparation for the kids. It's great for the Yankees, and I can't wait to root for him another year.  Outstanding.

On the Santana trade front, not so much.  According to Jayson Stark at ESPN, the Twins pulled an about-face and asked for Kennedy--the player they didn't want to headline a potential trade--to be the third player with Hughes and Melky.  The Yankees apparently said no way, and I think that's the right move, and not just because the Yankees will have Pettite back--though that doesn't hurt, either. With a rotation of Wang, Pettite, Hughes, Joba and Kennedy, the Yankees have to be fairly optimistic that they can get better results from the rotation than they could from Wang, Pettite, Mussina, Karstens, and Igawa, the 2007 version of the rotation.  Though they would potentially have three kids in the rotation should the Santana trade fall through, on the surface this presents better potential than last year's semi-anemic crew.  Plus, the Yankees have some serious bullpen issues to solve, not the least of which is replacing the gaping hole that Joba's likely move to the rotation opens.  That is, the Yankees would have a pretty good rotation if they keep all the kid pitchers, would still have Melky, and would have the chance to either pursue Dan Haren and some real bullpen help.

The Kennedy request from the Twins should have been immediately rejected. Though I really like Santana, that's simply too much for the Yankees to give up--two of the top three young pitching prospects, plus the starting center fielder.  Forget it.  Let the Twins sit and stew on it for a while.  If another team acquires Santana, I'd take my chances with the kids, and I doubt that I'm alone here in that regard.  A good part of me would wish the Yankees had Santana, especially when they faced him, but not for that asking price. That would be as Mike, Beth, and others have warned--giving up the farm, and I'm opposed to that as well.  The Twins might as well say, "Give us the moon for the fact that we can't/won't sign this great player, whose potential salary we don't want, to enormous bucks." Nope.  If that's the price, keep the kids and nearly everyone on the Yankees' side of the ledger sleeps well at night.

I hope that everyone is well out there.

Well, it's happened.  According to the New York Daily News and ESPN, the Yankees have decided to up the offer to the Twins by including Phil Hughes in the trade offer for Johan Santana.  The article in the Daily News did not say who needed to be convinced in what was apparently a heated, ongoing discussion over including Hughes, but it's not a stretch to consider that it may have been Cashman, the most ardent proponent of building the team around young pitching talent.

After hours of extensive internal polling, with the results being 50.2% to 49.8%, I say fine.  [Full Disclosure: The 49.8% side of me has demanded a recount after rampant accusations of mental ballot-box stuffing by the 50.2% side.  The case is currently on the Winter docket of the Mental Supreme Court. Stay tuned.] Should the Yankees pull off the deal, there are several reasons why I would be fine with it.

#1: The Yankees would be acquiring Johan Santana, not some schlub, who would not need to acclimate himself to pitching in the AL.  He's got big-time stuff.  He's a great lefty who would pitch in a stadium historically very good to good lefties.  He's an ace, and the Yankees haven't had one for some time.  I give Pettite full marks for his excellent work last year, and he became the Yankees' number one, most reliable starter.  But an ace is something different altogether, and the difference isn't merely semantical.  Normally, Pettite would be an ideal number two starter, a terrific pitcher with very good stuff, tough, a stopper, but not the top of the line.  Santana can do things, both on the mound and for the team generally, that could give him a ridiculous record, and low ERA.  2007 wasn't his best year, but he's been great.

#2:  Let's face it, the Yankees' starting pitching was for the most part pretty decent at best last year, and due to a rash of injuries and the Igawa/Pavoldemort factors, was abysmal at the beginning of the year.  The Yankees also lacked the starting pitching to effectively compete in the playoffs, with the exceptions of Pettite and Hughes for several innings.  Santana changes that immediately.  The top of the rotation, not to mention the rotation as a whole, is markedly improved should he come in a trade.  Wang becomes the number two, which might suit him better.

#3:  While the Yankees would give up a terrific young pitcher in Hughes, they wouldn't be giving away the farm.  They would, and really should, still keep Joba and Kennedy, and have others such as Alan Horne (presumably) waiting in the wings.  They also appear committed to taking a good look at Ross Ohlendorf, who started but was used later, and gained much-needed velocity, as a reliever.  They would be losing a great prospect, but wouldn't lose their only prospect, and would still have two very young, relatively inexperienced, but talented starters in the rotation.  It wouldn't compromise the turn toward the youth movement very much.  In fact, it would complement it with a great starter with experience and much to teach the others.

#4: Remember when the Yankees traded for Clemens before the 1999 season, they gave up David Wells, Graeme Lloyd, and Homer Bush, the first two of whom were key parts in the greatest baseball team by a mile in the desegregated era.  You have to give to get, and the Yankees would get a great one.  Santana is certainly different from Clemens, both in what they have accomplished and their styles.  But both were/are front-line pitchers.  They're usually worth it.  Clemens was without question.  My gut tells me Santana would be as well.  For all his greatness and individual accolades, Clemens didn't win any rings before his tenure with the Yankees; nor has Santana.  His chance for that, and for the Yankees I might add, would dramatically increase with such a trade.

It's a tough move to make, a very hard decision, and who's to say that the Twins don't try to extract more from the Yankees.  Should that happen, should the Twins demand another proven player, they can forget it.  Hughes, Melky, and a third lesser prospect should be enough.  The Yankees have Johnny Damon to play center and he's due for a better offensive year, they might pursue a free-agent center fielder such as Aaron Rowand, and they would still have most of their best young pitching talent--AND SANTANA.

With a hard swallow, make the deal.